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In this working paper, I investigate what I see as the major themes for the debate 
that we need to have to be prepared for the next pandemic. These themes are 
developed against the background of a more thorough investigation in my 
monograph Pandemic Economics (van Bergeijk 2021) about the history of 
pandemic research. An addendum to the book is necessary, as the pandemic and 
recovery constantly unfold. Humanity cannot rely on modern medicine to beat 
the next ‘disease X’ and the world cannot afford the extortionate health and 
economic policy interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic again. 
Therefore, a major global investment project is necessary to reduce the 
vulnerability to and impact of pandemics. It is important to recognize that 
inequalities to a large extent determine pandemic vulnerability and hence, 
adjustment of SDGs is necessary. From the COVID-19 pandemic we learned 
that the international economic organizations suffered from disaster myopia and 
that the self-image of the advanced economies is distorted. It also has become 
apparent that ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ health care was generally practiced while 
global health care should have been the norm. A discussion on the related issues 
of rationing, triage and scarcity of health care during a pandemic is urgently 
needed. 
Keywords 
COVID-19, Corona, Economics, Health care, Political economy, Pandemic, 
Preparation, Pandemic preparedness, Management, Inequality. 
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The political economy of the next pandemic 
1 Introduction 
People all around the world are getting hope again. Quite a few vaccines against 
the coronavirus have been developed at warp speed in western market 
economies, Russia and China. This is an unprecedented achievement, and the 
anticipation of an end to the current pandemic is the light at the end of the 
tunnel that we hoped for. This is, however, no reason for complacency but rather 
a moment in time to think about the future after COVID-19. A period that is 
paradoxically both post-pandemic and pre-pandemic.  
     COVID-19 is certainly not the last pandemic that humanity will experience: 
the frequency of pandemics has increased since 1700 despite enormous 
improvements in housing, hygiene and living standards. The reason is that health 
care improvements and social development were outpaced by higher pandemic 
risk. This risk is associated with global travel, human–wildlife interaction, 
intensification of global food production, and densification of population 
(Daszak, 2012). The emergence of contagious virus should have come as no 
surprise, yet 
‘preparedness’ to deal with the emergency was below standard. (Sathyamala, 
2021) The next pandemic, likewise is a certainty; only its timing is uncertain.  
FIGURE 1  














The next pandemic is coming, and the frequency of pandemics is increasing 
(Figure 1), but clear limits exist for the number of well-trained medical staff and 
space for quality care during pandemics. Since the costs of lockdowns and the 
toll of prioritization of a new disease over existing diseases are very high, future 
‘non-pharmaceutical interventions’ need to be designed more intelligently, 
helping societies to restructure and support the transition from a basically 
ignorant and domestically-oriented into a pandemic-aware society.   
    In this working paper, I investigate what I see as the major themes for the 
debate that we need to have. These are themes that are developing against the 
background of a more thorough investigation in my book Pandemic Economics 
(van Bergeijk 2021) about the history of pandemic research, as the pandemic and 
recovery unfold. Section 2 argues that we cannot rely on modern medicine to 
beat the next ‘disease X’, and that a major global investment project is necessary 
to reduce vulnerability to and impact of pandemics. Section 3 delves into 
pandemic paradoxes that to a large extent explain why the Black Swan of the 
health and economic policy interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic 
occurred. Section 4 focuses on inequalities that to a large extent, determine 
pandemic vulnerability and discusses the relationship with SDGs and 
development cooperation. Section 5 reveals three inconvenient truths: the 
international economic organizations suffered from disaster myopia; the self-
image of the advanced economies is distorted; during the pandemic beggar-thy-
neighbor health care was generally partitioned, while global health care should 
have been the norm. By way of conclusion, Section 6 addresses the related issues 
of rationing, triage, and scarcity of health care during a pandemic. A politically 





2 Modern medicine is not the answer to the next 
pandemic 
We cannot rely on a medical cure for the next pandemic despite humanity’s 
success in finding a solution for COVID-19. For one thing, many of the medical 
interventions, new drugs and vaccines are not nearly as effective as commonly 
thought. The pandemic has exposed that we can be empty handed if we are hit 
by a new ‘disease X’. Comparing modern pandemic preparedness with the 
situation during the Spanish Flu in the 1910s, David Morens and Anthony Fauci 
(2007, p. 1025) concluded a decade ago that ‘Almost all “then-versus-now” 
comparisons are encouraging, in theory’. Their ‘in theory’ is not an innocent 
addition: antiviral and antibiotic resistance, medical capacity constraints and the 
vulnerability of the just-in-time character of the medical supply chain are by now 
familiar problems. Also, we may not be able to find a vaccine against the next 
virus attack (Lassa fever is an example of such a disease with pandemic potential; 
see Salami et al., 2020). More importantly, we know that the key medical inputs 
(i.e., well-trained staff and access to high quality facilities) cannot be stock piled. 
During a pandemic these inputs will always be in short supply. A pandemic is, 
therefore, all about scarcity.  And economics, the science of scarcity, is therefore 
essential for any viable strategy to beat the next pandemic. 
Pandemic management 
Because of the obvious limits to medical solutions, we need to prepare and find 
ways to structurally mitigate the impact of a virus on the move. We need to work 
on ‘pandemic management’ just as we have developed disaster management. 
Our main efforts need to develop more intelligent ‘non-pharmaceutical 
interventions’ – more intelligent than the short-term measures that we have used 
in 2020 and 2021. This is the first time in history that we have used lockdowns 
worldwide and in almost all countries at the same time. The costs of the short-
term measures are becoming increasingly aggravated by unacceptable rationing 
of non-COVID care and a disastrous impact on the economy. The limits to 
lockdowns that require perseverance and discipline are also becoming 
increasingly clear. Lockdowns have worked during the first wave, but to maintain 
such a regime for more than a few months is doubtful if at all possible. We, thus, 
need to start thinking about the long run. 
The five P’s: prepare, prepare, prepare, prepare, prepare 
Preparation should take place at five relevant levels: individual (households and 
firms), local, national, international, and global pandemic preparedness. It is 
important to realize that the strength of the defense against the next pandemic 
will be determined by the weakest link, and it cannot be stressed enough that all 
five levels of defense need to be active. Basic hygiene, masks, social distancing, 
and awareness provide the final line of defense at the individual level, but 
pandemics also require rethinking of city designs and the proper roles of nations, 




effective if individuals are not prepared. However, individuals and firms can 
prepare for a pandemic but without human collective action, viruses will always 
be able to win the battle.  
FIGURE 2 





A major global investment project 
Pandemic preparedness must cover prevention, detention, delay and mitigation. 
A major global investment project is necessary to enhance humanity’s resilience, 
and economic analysis of the societal costs and benefits is key to its success. 
Pandemic economics shows how economic analysis can play its role, and how 
economics can provide new insights for epidemiology. Economics alone cannot 
solve the pandemic problem, of course. We really need to marry medicine and 
economics. That requires, perhaps, the biggest investment: a mental investment 
to understand in a truly multidisciplinary way that pandemics are essentially 
about behavior and choices that need to be made on a rational basis despite the 
emotions related to the outbreak of a new disease. 
  
Individual and firm






3 Pandemic paradoxes 
Economics as a science responded quickly to COVID-19, much quicker and 
more comprehensively than during the Spanish Flu pandemic (Boianovsky and 
Erreygers. 2021). Baldwin and Weber di Mauro (2020a,b) organized the 
profession’s rapid response and an impressive follow up with the launch of Covid 
Economics, Vetted and Real-Time Papers that provides real time analyses of the 
pandemic impact and ensuing policies. Consequently, as illustrated in Figure 3, 
the ‘now’ is being covered well by economics.   
FIGURE 3 
Development of economic work in progress 
 
 
Similarly, the past has a clear imprint of the economists’ work. Before the 
outbreaks, economists already stressed the risks and dismal consequences of 
‘disease X’: ‘Few doubt that major epidemics and pandemics will strike again, 
and few would argue that the world is adequately prepared’ (Fan, Jamison and 
Summers 2018, p. 129). Indeed, a substantial pre-COVID-19 literature exists 
providing detailed analyses and estimates of potential tolls of pandemics (van 
Bergeijk 2021, Chapter 2). Thus, the ‘past’ was also covered well by many in the 
field, although institutional preparation was low (Sands, El Turabi, Saynisch, and 




Paradoxes of achievement 
It is now time to start looking to the future. Not the immediate future – 
economics and epidemiology are already working hard on that. We need, 
however, to look at society’s preparedness for the next pandemic. The reason is 
the ‘paradox of medical and social achievement’: our impressive worldwide life 
expectancy increase has amplified our pandemic vulnerability. Figure 4 illustrates 
this paradox providing a counterfactual for the Spanish Flu and COVID-19 
based on mortality rates by age cohort (historic data and forecasts for the world 
population). In the 1950s, COVID-19 would have hit a younger world 
population, and like the 1957–1958 Asian flu pandemic, it would have been 
serious, but from a longer time perspective, relatively mild as the comparison 
with the Spanish Flu counterfactual shows. By 2070, however, the world’s 
population – thanks to medical and economic progress – will have aged so much 
that a coronavirus could ‘beat’ the Spanish Flu. 
FIGURE 4 
Counterfactual: Hypothetical death rate of Spanish Flu and COVID-19 
 
Source: van Bergeijk (2021), Figure 2.9, p. 31. 
 
Moreover, there is a second paradox: medical performance was so good that the 
world did not prepare for a medical breakdown, especially in the advanced 
economies. Here, both the general public and policy makers had difficulty 
imagining a life-threatening situation that modern medicine could not cure. 
These paradoxes probably drove the policy response to the pandemic, that 
ultimately was the true Black Swan of the pandemic: for the first time in history, 
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Baldwin and Weber di Mauro already foresaw that COVID-19 is as contagious 
economically as it is medically. This natural policy experiment (the outburst of 
what I call ‘pandonomics’) shocks the world with a multifaceted cluster of health 
policies as well as fiscal and monetary policies.  
Textbox 1 
What is pandonomics? 
Pandonomics /panˈdonɒmɪks/ 
Noun, singular: pandonomics; plural: pandonomics 
A multifaceted cluster of inordinate health care and economic policies in reaction 
to COVID-19.  
Origin 
The ‘onomics’-part reflects the impact of health policies on the economy, as well 
as the response of economic policymakers to the health policy shock by means 
of fiscal and monetary policies.  
The ‘pand’-part reflects that Pandonomics spreads quicker than COVID-19 to the 
capitals of developed and emerging economies.  
Example: Pandonomics enhanced the destruction of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The heterogeneity of the impact of the pandemic on life and livelihoods as well 
as the diversity of strategies and policies provide a unique data rich environment 
that will allow detailed answers on what works and what is better to avoid. 
    We should, however, take time for this because our statistical apparatus, 
especially the National Accounts, requires processing time. Indeed, revisions of 
the current ‘flash’ estimates of economic activity will bring better coverage and 
understanding of the sectors and activities that expanded during lockdowns, 
including household production (van Bergeijk 2021, Chapter 4). Moreover, in 
many areas we are learning that we should not rely too much on ‘nowcasting’ 
based on data science techniques during periods of significant and fast changes. 
The data-generating processes constantly change, and machine learning does not 
pick up these changes on the basis of its training data (Meijerink, Hendriks, van 
Bergeijk, 2020). On top of this standard procedures for seasonal adjustment 
break down during a pandemic (Abeln and Jacobs 2021). 
     What we do know from first principles is that the world cannot afford 
pandonomics again. Pandonomics is a ruin problem: a high impact event with a 
high probability of surviving a single event but a low probability of surviving 
repeated exposures (Norman, Bar-Yam, Taleb 2020). We are also learning that 
lockdownsrequire discipline and endurance, both of which are in short supply in 
modern Western democracies. We discover the opportunity costs of the 
prioritization of COVID-19: the health toll for the non-COVID sector, the 
mental and societal costs that ultimately will have an impact on the population’s 
health, and the purely economic costs of a debt increase cum quantitative easing. 
Estimating the exact costs will take time because some impacts are drawn out, 
but the implication is already clear: we must develop alternatives to lockdowns. 
This form of pandemic preparation is an area where economic science and policy 
can make a significant contribution.  
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Sub-fields of economics relevant for pandemic preparation 
Four sub-fields of economics are relevant for pandemic preparation: political 
economy, societal cost-benefit analysis, development economics and 
international economics. From a political economy perspective, the organization 
of society is key (Wyplosz, 2020; see also Farzanegan, 2021). Figure 5 provides 
an illustration for a selection of countries and makes four points. First, China 
still stands out as the country with the most stringent measures and a low death 
rate. Second, the worst performing G7 countries over time have taken almost as 
much liberty away from their population as China did, but they have a much 
higher death rate. Third, the outcomes on the European continent vary widely 
suggesting that culture, institutions and policies matter. Fourth, a comparison 
between Asia and Europe likewise underscores the importance of the 
organization of society. A deeper investigation of different societal settings – 
from a Darwinian Society via a Big Brother Society to an Autarkic Autocracy – 
shows that bad institutions and behavior can make us extra vulnerable, but also 
it illustrates that pandemic-resistant societal organization can delay the spread of 
a disease (van Bergeijk 2021, Chapter 6). Unfortunately, the idea that we can stop 
or prevent pandemics is an illusion.  
FIGURE 5 
Cumulative stringency and COVID-deaths per million population  
 
















































     Development economics is also highly relevant (Papyrakis, 2021). The 
massive use of non-pharmaceutical interventions in the OECD countries, both 
in health policy and in economic policy, did not consider the external effects on 
other countries. But the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions crosses 
borders just as easily as the Coronavirus, and pandonomics strongly affects the 
Global South. The economic risk of the pandemic is not concentrated where the 
death rate is highest, but in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Least Developed 
Countries in South Asia (Noy et al., 2020). The economic impact was felt by 
those countries before the disease reached developing countries and emerging 
markets, when the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic spread to the Americas 
by the end of May 2020. The transmission mechanisms are multiple, as shown 
by the following examples. 
FIGURE 6 









Source: Behsudi (2020). 
Global tourism stopped overnight (in 2019 the share of tourism in regional GDP 
had ranged from 6.5% in Sub-Saharan Africa to 13.9% in the Caribbean; see 
World Travel and Tourism Council, 2020) with dramatic contractions in real 





FDI inflows by region, 2019 and 2020 (billions of US dollars) 
 
2019 2020 
Africa 46 38 
Latin American 160 101 
Developing Asia 495 476 
Transition economies 58 13 
 759 628 
Source: UNCTAD (2021) 
Capital flows were under pressure with FDI inflows in the Global North 
reducing by 121 billion US dollars (-12%) and remittances taking a similar turn. 
Importantly, vaccination and health care programs for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, and other infectious diseases derailed with a catastrophic impact that 
may be higher than COVID-19’s direct impact. A survey, covering 106 
countries, found that approximately three-quarters of current programs were 
impacted negatively – threatening an additional indirect death toll of 1,440,000 
in developing countries (Global Fund, 2020).  
   The point of this incomplete overview is that external effects on the Global 
South are directly relevant (see also Djankov and Panizza 2020, Swartz and 
Valeske 2020 and Parashari and Swartz, 2020). Development economics is also 
important, because the major recent almost-pandemics (or ‘international 
epidemics’, in the words of WHO) have been in Africa, namely Ebola and 
HIV/AIDS. Development economists by the very nature of their specialization 
are dealing with countries that regularly suffer under the impact of contagious 
diseases on the economy, and their findings have a lot of direct relevance to the 
analysis of pandemics. Gallagher et al. (2020) and Griffith-Jones et al.  (2020) 
argue that major changes in the international finance architecture and 
development cooperation are necessary to develop and strengthen a global 
financial safety net to meet the fallout of the pandemic. 
     Finally, international economics will argue that international policy 
coordination and external effects are key issues. The nation state is not always 
the optimal health care area and certainly not during pandemics. The EU 
provides a clear example of highly integrated markets with free movement of 
people, but national health policies in Europe remain unsynchronized.  
     One of the basic international economics lessons is that we need global public 
goods for a well-functioning world economy. The best way forward is to expand 
the WHO mandate and use existing economic policy structures to manage the 
economics of delivery of these goods (e.g., country surveillance by IMF, OECD, 
World Bank, peer-review and best practices exchange).  The lesson highlighting 
that strengthening global governance is an elementary step in pro-active 
pandemic preparedness, is certainly not new – it has been already made with 
respect to Ebola, AIDS/HIV, and SARS. However, our response to COVID-
19 has shown again that we do need to take that lesson serious. 
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4 Fighting pandemics = Fighting inequalities 
The most important lesson from the COVID-19 pandemic is that inequalities 
are the Achilles heel of a society that has been hit by an epidemic. This is true 
for the full range of societal organization as discussed earlier. The spread of 
disease can be delayed but not stopped. We thus need to prepare for the next 
pandemic. The advent of a new ‘disease X’ is a certainty; only its timing is 
uncertain.  
Did we learn? 
One learns a lot about humanity during a pandemic. Pandemics reveal 
imbalances, contradictions, and inequalities that we can no longer ignore at the 
peril of succumbing under the pressure of the next pandemic. 
     We have learned that access to basic health care is not guaranteed any more 
during a pandemic and that marginalized groups are the most vulnerable. We 
have learned that essential workers are at high risk of getting infected and that 
society cannot survive without the people that continue to provide those 
essential services. We have learned that working conditions and the organization 
of workplaces to a large extent determine the speed of transmission of a virus 
and that especially low-income earners appear to work in places where outbreaks 
occur frequently. We have learned that marginalized poor and informal sector 
workers have no access to hygienic facilities and that lockdowns are not a 
realistic tool since their livelihoods are threatened. We have learned that the most 
vulnerable clusters in society consist of people that have no opportunity to work 
from home, need to travel by public transportation, have low incomes and that 
their housing does not allow much scope for social distancing. We have learned 
that this is true both for the Global South and the Global North. We have 
learned… I sincerely hope that we have learned. 
A business proposition 
The fact that COVID-19 is a pandemic amplifies our current problems, but even 
for new contagious diseases that do not reach all continents, inequalities are the 
breeding ground for disease spreading and consequent suffering. Reducing 
epidemic vulnerabilities requires to reduce the inequalities. But fighting the next 
pandemic implies that we cannot limit our attention to inequalities at home, 
because the inequalities around the world – within and between countries – 
provide hot spots and disease pools from which new variants, viruses, and other 
contagious diseases emerge. The implication is that reducing inequalities in other 
countries and continents becomes a business proposition: an investment project 
with a high rate of return.  
‘Wash your hands!’ and the SDGs 
One of the least intrusive and most effective measures against any contagious 
disease is hand and respiratory hygiene. It is extremely important that 
handwashing is trained at home and at school, and that this discipline is 
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maintained. What we have learned from COVID-19 is that every Earthling is at 
risk, so we cannot afford the luxury of focusing only on the groups that are 
particularly vulnerable to infections. Handwashing, for example, is only possible 
if clean water, sink facilities and soap are available to everyone. Since a pandemic 
is global, the approach needs to be global. Provision of handwashing facilities in 
developing countries is a low-cost but highly-impactful precautionary measure 
that the advanced economies could finance.  
     Since handwashing facilities in developing countries are a cheap, significant 
and necessary precaution for the advanced economies, SDG 6 ‘Ensure access to 
clean water and sanitation for all’ is an excellent business proposal that reduces 
pandemic vulnerability. Investing in clean water and sanitation is a very cost-
effective tool to alleviate global pandemic vulnerability. Moreover, 
understanding that poverty is a breeding ground for pandemics implies that 
income inequality between and within countries is much more important than 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seem to acknowledge (van der 
Hoeven and van Bergeijk, 2018; van Bergeijk and van der Hoeven, 2017)). From 
this perspective, reformulation, reconsideration and reprioritization of SDGs 
may be necessary. 
It is the planet stupid! 
The scale of preparations cannot be international (i.e., involving many countries) 
but needs to be global (i.e., involving all countries). This had, of course, to some 
extent already been recognized before the corona crisis by the move from ‘in-
ternational health’ to ‘global health’. Pandemics, however, have not yet received 
the explicit attention they need in the SDGs. The SDGs (and in particular, the 
SDG 3 ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages’) do not 
mention prevention of pandemics per se. Health target 3.3 ‘By 2030, end the ep-
idemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical diseases and com-
bat hepatitis, water-borne diseases and other communicable diseases’ could be 
easily adjusted. Target 3.d ‘Strengthen the capacity of all countries, in particular 
developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of na-
tional and global health risks’ looks satisfactory at first sight, but it misses the 
point that the ‘in particular’ is equally relevant for the advanced countries. In 
other words, the SDGs are targets for every country independent of its level of 
development. 
     This might be the most important lesson for the Global North: the advanced 
economies are not invulnerable, and they were ill-prepared. The Global North 
needs to take inequalities seriously in order to survive. Fighting inequalities glob-
ally and domestically is the best business proposition that we have for the Global 




5 Three inconvenient truths 
A myth exists that the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact could not have been 
foreseen. According to the IMF’s Economic Counsellor, 
 
[a] pandemic scenario had been raised as a possibility in previous 
economic policy discussions, but none of us had a meaningful sense 
of what it would look like on the ground and what it would mean 
for the economy (Gopinath, 2020, p. v) 
 
Likewise, in a short ‘overview article’ Rasul (2020, p. 265) characterized the 
literature on viral outbreaks as a ‘nascent literature’.  
     Economic analysis of epidemics and pandemics and their impact was, 
however, not embryonic and a significant literature exists (van Bergeijk, 2021, 
especially Chapter 2). Policy makers at the World Bank were well aware of the 
devastations of Ebola and HIV/AIDS. The point is that the international 
organizations ignored the topic. Sands et al. (2016), for example, point out a lack 
of analyses of the economic impact of pandemics by global and regional 
institutions analyzing three well-known economic publications regarding fifteen 
countries that were most severely hit by SARS, MERS, Ebola, and Zika, 
distinguishing between the two years before the outbreak and the two years after 
the outbreak. Their findings show complete ignorance of epidemic risk in the 
IMF Article IV consultations two years before any outbreak.  
The self-image of the Western economies 
It is no exaggeration that the pre-COVID-19 self-evaluations of the advanced 
economies in Europe and the United States show that they suffered from 
disaster myopia and cognitive dissonance. To specify, international organizations 
had pointed out that the lack of preparedness was mainly a problem of the non-
OECD countries. A fairly random example is the 2017 World Bank study Disease 
Control Priorities: Improving Health and Reducing Poverty, that reports: 
 
A geographic analysis of preparedness shows that some areas of high spark 
risk also are the least prepared. Geographic areas with high spark risk from 
domesticated animals (including China, North America, and Western Europe) 
have relatively higher levels of preparedness although China lags behind its 
counterparts. However, geographic areas with high spark risk from wildlife 
species (including Central and West Africa) have some of the lowest 
preparedness scores globally, indicating a potentially dangerous overlap of 
spark risk and spread risk. (Madhav et al., 2017), pp. 320 – 321)  
 
Even though the fallacy and peril of this perception were acknowledged, no 
action was undertaken (Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for 
the Future 2016, International Working Group on Financing Preparedness, 
2017, World Health Organization 2019). The inconvenient truth is that the 
world has been busy fighting COVID-19, but that no steps have been set to 
increase pandemic preparedness. The post-COVID-19 world is simply as ill-
prepared as the pre-COVID-19 one. 
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Beggar-thy-neighbour health care 
One of the most disturbing facts has been the lack of a truly global approach to 
the pandemic. To a large extent, that did not come as a surprise: health care 
policies by and large have remained in the national and state realm even if 
sovereignty in other government activity areas was transferred to higher federal 
or supranational levels. (Saltman 2008) The reason is that health care is of direct 
impact for the franchise: voters care about their health a lot. What came as a 
surprise is that competition between states for medical emergency supplies was 
fierce. For instance, in the US, the competition was not only observed between 
the individual states, but also between the federal government and the states 
(Polifact, 2020) The inconvenient truth is that health care during a pandemic is 
one of the few remaining fields where raw and unrestricted beggar-thy-




6  In conclusion: rationing, triage and scarcity 
Ultimately pandemics are all about scarcity. The problem is that everybody gets 
ill at the same time and needs access to health care. This makes health care 
workers and facilities extra vulnerable, and it threatens a breakdown of the health 
care system that would further reduce health care provision and increase scarcity. 
Universal health care access is impossible during pandemics as we learned from 
the comparatively mild case of COVID-19. Access is already limited for non-
COVID patients and the health consequences of this restriction will only 
become clear in the longer term. It may be necessary to rethink health care access 
and prepare dedicated medical facilities for the next ‘disease X’. It may also be 
necessary to increase the pool of medical staff by means of conscription and 
mobilization.   
    The reasons to think outside the box are clear since the usual economic recipe 
in a (neo)liberal economy is irrelevant: we cannot leave this to the market 
because supply and demand are price inelastic in this situation. That means that 
the world is in a second-best scenario and needs to consider rationing rather 
than universal access to health care. However, many of the key economic 
insights are still very relevant: the economics of lockdowns is no rocket science, 
and the tools to analyze short-term and long-term impacts of pandemics are 
available (van Bergeijk 2021, Chapter 5). Sophisticated analyses exist of repressed 
inflation and central planning (Davis and Charemza 2012) as well as rationing in 
a blend of computable equilibrium models, neo-Keynesian models and models 
for economies with non-market clearing prices.  
     From such analyses, we can understand what happened on the markets for 
ventilators, medical masks and vaccines. It also showcases that the ‘the 
phenomenon of manipulation through demand and supply leads then to a 
perverse phenomenon of overbidding, and to the non-existence of an 
equilibrium unless additional constraints are put on demands and supplies’ 
(Bénassy 2016). The upshot is that rationing needs to be designed and monitored 
properly in order to be efficient – the most important requirement is that 
rationing cannot be manipulated by offering or asking quantities above what is 
necessary. 
     The big issue is, however, not in the technicalities but in the perceived 
(im)morality of rationing. Rules to allocate access to health care need to be 
designed since triage is unavoidable. (Triage is a form of medical rationing that 
determines access to health care based on the probability for survival after 
treatment; it is a common practice during disasters and mass accidents.). The 
claim that every person has the right to being treated at an intensive care facility 
makes no sense during disasters, and it does not make sense during pandemics 
either. The debate on triage and the design of efficient rationing schedules 
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